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  We investigate the effect of imports and exports on total factor productivity in Korea 
during 1980-2003. We find Granger causality from imports to total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth, but no causality from exports to TFP growth. We then investigate the 
impact of trade and other variables on TFP growth. According to our results, imports 
have a significant positive effect on TFP growth but exports do not. In addition, our 
results indicate that the positive impact of imports arises not only from the competitive 
pressures associated with the imports of consumer goods but also from technological 
transfers embodied in imports of capital goods from developed countries.  
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 1 Introduction 
   Many economists attribute the rapid economic growth of East Asian countries during 
the second half of the last century to an export-driven growth strategy which initially 
protected domestic firms from foreign competition. Implementing this strategy, East 
Asian governments were able to hasten the catch-up process by directing limited 
resources into a small number of strategically selected industries and absorbing advanced 
technologies from developed countries. Export expansion contributed to the economic 
growth not only by facilitating factor mobilization and capital accumulation in a 
quantitative sense but also by promoting productivity growth through the emulation of 
advanced foreign technology and through competition in foreign markets. Furthermore, 
domestic markets were initially protected by trade barriers so that domestic firms would 
have enough breathing room to grow up from infancy. 
   Perceptions about East Asian growth later changed, however, as the Japanese economy 
succumbed to prolonged depression in the early 1990s and regional developing countries 
suffered from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. This turn of economic events 
rekindled the earlier debates about East Asian growth which had revolved around the 
sources of growth and the role of trade. In the context of the productivity debate, 
accumulationists argued that East Asia’s rapid growth was largely driven by input 
accumulation whereas assimilationists believed the driving force to be a high rate of 
technical change made possible by the diffusion of technology from developed 
countries.
1 In the context of the trade and growth debate, economists have focused their 
attention on the role of trade in East Asian growth. Some support the export-led growth 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Hwang (1998). 
  2hypothesis, while others advocate the importance of market opening for growth.
2
   In The East Asian Miracle, the World Bank (1993) suggested that exports and export-
promoting policies had been instrumental in East Asia’s adoption of frontier technologies, 
which enhanced the productivity of exporting firms and economies in general, thus 
accelerating economic growth. In addition, many studies provided empirical evidence in 
support of the export-led growth hypothesis by showing that exports had a significant 
positive effect on productivity and economic growth. In contrast, Lawrence and 
Weinstein (1999) argued that the World Bank (1993) focused only on the export-growth 
relationship, and thus ignored the role of imports in promoting productivity. For Japan, 
Lawrence and Weinstein found that protection was actually harmful to productivity 
growth, and exports did not enhance productivity whereas imports did. They also find 
similar evidence for the US and Korea although the evidence is much more preliminary 
due to the preliminary nature of their empirical analysis for the two countries. Such 
findings suggest that learning, innovation and competitive pressures resulting from 
foreign imports are important conduits for growth.  
      This study investigates the link between trade and productivity growth for Korea, 
especially the import-productivity nexus. First, we investigate the dynamic interaction 
between trade variables and productivity growth using a vector error correction model 
(VECM) which captures both short-run dynamic changes and long-run relationships. Our 
empirical results suggest that imports cause productivity growth but provide no evidence 
of any causality from exports to productivity growth. In particular, this direction of 
causality is apparent in both bivariate models and trivariate models that consist of imports, 
                                                           
2 For surveys of the debates on TFP growth and trade in East Asia, see Chen (1997) and Edwards (1993), 
respectively. 
  3exports, and total factor productivity (TFP). Second, in order to identify the specific 
reasons for the import-productivity relationship, we estimate a productivity determination 
equation which includes various trade variables, along with government size and research 
and development (R&D) investments, as explanatory variables. Our empirical results 
again indicate that imports, but not exports, are a significant determinant of productivity 
growth. Furthermore, the beneficial impact of imports stems not only from competitive 
pressures arising from imports of consumer goods but also from technological transfers 
embodied in imports of capital goods and imports from developed countries. 
      Our study is the first to systematically explore the relationship between trade and 
productivity growth in the Korean economy since we look at the impact of both exports 
and imports on productivity growth. Previous studies analyzing the relationship between 
trade and productivity growth in Korea have defined trade as exports. Therefore, they 
have focused upon the causality between Korean exports and growth, and largely ignored 
the role of imports in Korean growth. The one paper to examine the impact of imports on 
Korean productivity, by Lawrence and Weinstein (1999), does so very briefly and only in 
passing since it is primarily an analysis of Japanese data. The neglect of imports in the 
analysis of Korean productivity is rather surprising in light of theoretical developments 
that have established imports as an important channel for technological transfers and 
economic growth. Such neglect is also unfortunate in light of the fact that Korea’s 
economic success is widely put forth as evidence supportive of the export-led growth 
hypothesis, which means it would be especially interesting to look at the impact of both 
exports and imports in Korean growth. In short, our study provides a more balanced and 
comprehensive analysis of the trade-growth nexus in Korea than the existing studies. At a 
  4broader lever, we hope that our study will be a useful contribution to the empirical 
literature on imports and productivity, which is considerably more limited than the 
empirical literature on exports and productivity. 
2 Literature Review 
   In this section, we review the existing literature on trade and productivity. In theory, 
there is a two-way causal relationship between trade and productivity but advocates of 
export-led growth generally contend that exports enhance productivity growth.
3 These 
economists argue that firms tend to learn advanced technologies through exports and 
must adopt them to compete in the foreign marketplace.
4 Firms also learn by doing, and 
emulate foreign rivals through the trial and error process inherent in the production and 
sale of export goods.
5 Furthermore, the expansion in production resulting from exports 
reduces unit production prices and thus increases productivity.
6 In addition to these 
effects, exports also provide a country with foreign exchange, which is often scarce in the 
early stages of economic development, enabling a country to import capital and 
intermediate goods. Thus, for a variety of reasons, exports increase productivity growth.
7 
The reverse causation from productivity growth to exports is also intuitively 
straightforward. Productivity growth improves a country’s international competitiveness 
in price and quality, and thereby boosts its exports. 
   An extensive empirical literature exists on the relationship between exports and growth, 
largely because of its bi-directionality. In fact, much of the empirical literature on trade 
and productivity defines trade as exports rather than imports. Empirical studies have tried 
                                                           
3 See, for example, Baldwin (2003), Bonelli (1992), Haddad, De Melo and Horton (1996), Weinhold and 
Rauch (1997), Yean (1997) and Sjoeholm (1999). 
4 Please refer to Balassa (1978), Krueger (1980) and Nishimizu and Robinson (1982). 
5 See Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
6 See Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
7 See McKinnon (1964). 
  5to determine whether exports cause productivity to increase.
8 However, results in this 
regard seem to depend on both the sample periods and the countries examined. Some 
studies find unidirectional causality running from exports to productivity while others 
find reverse causality between the two variables.
9 Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) 
argue that only relatively efficient firms engage in exports, and that exports do not bring 
down unit production costs. The basic thrust of all these works is a unidirectional 
causality from productivity growth to exports.
10 In their studies of U.S. firms, Bernard 
and Jensen (1999a, 1999b) also find that firms with high productivity usually export their 
products, and exporting firms do not experience productivity and wage increases greater 
than those of non-exporting firms. On the other hand, a number of studies find either 
bidirectional causality or absence of causality between exports and productivity.
11 For 
Korea, some studies support the export-led growth hypothesis whereas other studies 
either fail to find causality from growth to exports or find bi-directional causality.
12 The 
evidence on the direction of the causality between exports and growth in Korea is thus 
ambiguous at best, despite the widespread presumption of the validity of the export-led 
growth hypothesis. 
      The theoretical relationship between imports and productivity tends to be more 
complicated than that between exports and productivity. Increased imports of consumer 
products encourage domestic import-substituting firms to innovate and restructure 
                                                           
8 For a literature survey, see Greenaway and Sapsford (1994). 
9 Haddad, De Mel and Horton (1996) is an example of the former while Pavcnik (2000) is an example of 
the latter. 
10 Shan and Sun (1998), for example, fail to find unidirectional causality from exports to output and thus 
reject the export-led growth hypothesis for China. 
11 These include Hsiao (1987), Kunst and Marin (1989) and Jin and Yu (1996). 
12 Jung and Marshall (1985), Xu (1996) and Choi (2002) support the export-led growth hypothesis. Darrat 
(1986), Hsiao (1987), Dodaro (1993) and Dutt and Ghosh (1996) fail to find causality from growth to 
exports. Finally, Hsiao (1987), Chow (1987), Bahmani-Oskooee and Shabsigh (1991), Bahmani-Oskooe 
and Alse (1993) and Jin (1995) find bi-directional causality.  
  6themselves in order to compete with foreign rivals; therefore, imports enhance productive 
efficiency. Under perfect competition in the neoclassical model, an industry reduces 
factor usage in the short run when trade barriers are removed and the market is opened 
for imports. In the long run, however, the industry becomes more productive and 
competitive, and expands its investments in new technology, resulting in a rightward shift 
of the industry supply curve.
13 In general, the effect on productivity of opening the 
market depends on both market structure and institutional factors. Under imperfect 
competition, an import-substituting domestic market shrinks as imports increase, causing 
investment to fall and thereby productivity to eventually fall.
14 Furthermore, higher 
future expected profits lead to more active R&D investment and innovation efforts, and 
such R&D may be greater for exporting firms than for import-substituting firms in light 
of the large impact of market opening. Imports of capital goods and intermediate goods 
which cannot be produced domestically enable domestic firms to diversify and specialize, 
further enhancing their productivity.
15 Finally, there are also theoretical grounds for both 
positive and negative causality from productivity to imports.
16
   Relative to the empirical literature on exports and productivity, the number of empirical 
studies on the relationship between imports and productivity is quite limited. In particular, 
as pointed out earlier, the only study to empirically examine the relationship for Korea – 
Lawrence and Weinstein (1999) – does so only very briefly and focuses on Japan. Their 
                                                           
13 See Haddad, De Melo and Horton (1996) for a more comprehensive discussion. Hicks argued that severe 
market competition awakens firms from the laziness and comfort of a monopoly market and provides 
incentives for innovation. 
14 See Tybout (2000) for an extended discussion. Schumpeter, however, suggested that a certain level of 
monopoly in the market provides firms with excess profits with which to make R&D investments, thus 
promoting productivity. 
15 See Grossman and Helpman (1991), Sjoeholm (1999) and Tybout (2000). 
16 Productivity growth triggers economic growth and increases income, which, in turn, stimulates imports. 
On the other hand, increased productivity in an import-substituting industry crowds out imports from the 
domestic market and thus has a negative impact. 
  7main finding is that imports contributed to TFP growth for a panel data set of Japanese 
manufacturing industries, mainly through competition effects. A preliminary analysis in 
the same study fails to yield any systematic evidence that greater levels of protection 
improved productivity in Korea and the U.S. Lawrence (1999) shows empirically that 
import competition brought about TFP growth in U.S. industries. Muendler (2004) finds 
that in the Brazilian manufacturing sector the effects of imports on competition are large 
even though the effect of intermediate imports on labor productivity is small.
17
   To summarize, the above review of the existing literature reveals two key trends in the 
on-going debate about the trade-growth relationship. First, empirical tests of the export-
led growth hypothesis have produced mixed results. Second, with respect to the role of 
imports in growth, the empirical literature has lagged behind the theoretical literature.    
Our study extends previous research on the relationship between trade and productivity in 
several directions. First, we hope to contribute to the limited empirical literature on the 
imports-growth nexus by taking an in-depth look at the impact of imports on Korean total 
factor productivity. It is a particularly interesting to explore the role of imports in Korea 
since the country’s economic success has become a byword for export-led growth. 
Second, we disaggregate imports into various components in order to more clearly 
understand the channels through which imports affect productivity in Korea. Third, we 
eliminate the cyclical effects that co-move with business cycles from the productivity 
measures in order to control for spurious relation due to cyclical biases. Finally, we 
update the data set up to 2003 and estimate a TFP equation to investigate the 
macroeconomic relationship between trade and productivity. 
                                                           
17 Additional studies on imports and productivity include Gokcekus (1997), who finds that protectionism 
reduces technical progress. 
  8 3 Empirical Analysis and Results 
   In this section, we discuss our empirical analysis of the relationship between trade and 
total factor productivity in Korea. We also report our main empirical results and their 
implications about the role of trade in Korean productivity growth. 
3.1 Variables 
   Many existing studies on the trade-productivity nexus use labor productivity as the 
productivity measure, but this partial measure does not allow us to consider the effect of 
factor substitution between capital and labor. This effect is especially important for the 
Korean economy, which has continuously experienced capital deepening and adoption of 
new production technologies. Measures of labor productivity generally include the effects 
of capital deepening, along with technological progress and structural efficiency changes 
which determine TFP. It has recently been argued that Korean economic growth was 
driven mostly by factor accumulation rather than by productivity growth. Therefore, we 
use TFP, rather than capital deepening or labor productivity growth resulting from trade-
induced economies-of-scale, as our measure of productivity in order to measure the 
effects of trade on structural and technological changes. 
   We constructed our data on TFP from various sources in the Bank of Korea database 
and used the data to estimate Solow residuals for the period 1985Q1-2002Q4. The capital 
stock is taken to be the real amount of tangible fixed assets, adjusted for the capital 
utilization rate. In addition, we proxy labor inputs by the number of work hours, and use 
gross domestic product (GDP) as the measure of output.
18 All variables are converted 
into constant 1995 prices. The measured Solow residual is generally not a good measure 
of productivity growth in the absence of perfect competition, constant returns to scale, 
                                                           
18 For capital, we used the perpetual inventory method to expand the capital estimated by Pyo (2003). 
  9and full employment of labor and capital. This implies that the measured Solow residual 
may be affected by demand-side variables.
19 In the case of Korea, Kim and Lim (2004) 
find that the Solow residual is not a strictly exogenous variable but instead co-moves with 
demand shocks. 
   If measured productivities are indeed influenced by cyclical movements, an empirical 
correlation between trade and productivity may be spurious in the sense that it is driven 
by a correlation between trade and business cycles. For this reason, it is desirable to 
control for cyclical bias in the productivity measure. To address this problem, we follow 
the method suggested by Basu and Kimball (1997) and Ball and Moffitt (2001). This first 
step in this method is to regress the log difference of the measured Solow residual on the 
log difference of the capital utilization rate, which is a proxy for business cycles. The 
next step is to adjust the average of the regression error term so that it equals the original 
productivity measure when the productivity measure is adjusted for cyclical factors. Our 
estimation results indicate that the effect of the business cycle on the measured Solow 
residual is significant.
20 Our estimation results are shown in (1) below, where CU denotes 
the capital utilization rate and where t-statistics are inside the parentheses.
21 We find that 
removing cyclical effects from the measured Solow residual does not affect its overall 
movement but considerably reduces its variation.
22
                                                           
19 See Mankiw (1989) and Hall (1989) for more comprehensive discussions. 
20 Labor productivity not being affected by the capital utilization rate is a well-established result in real 
business cycle theory. Other proxies for business cycles such as military spending, oil shocks and political 
dummies have been suggested. However, a complete treatment is beyond the scope of our paper. 
21 While the business cycle can affect productivity, productivity can also affect business cycles. To 
eliminate this endogeneity problem, we only include lagged values of the capital utilization rate as 
explanatory variables in the regression. 
22 The purpose of adjusting TFP is to eliminate any error that may exist in the Solow residual as a 
productivity measure – to identify the part of the Solow residual that represents pure productivity. While 
the cyclical movement of the adjusted TFP is still smaller than the residual, the adjustment is not intended 
to completely eliminate the correlation between TFP and business cycles. The causality from TFP to 
business cycles is well-established in real business cycle theory, while the reverse effect from business 
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   Figure 1 below shows the growth rates of the measured Solow residual in Korea, and 
the TFP estimates we obtained after eliminating the cyclical effects from the residual. 
TFP increased steeply after the mid 1980s but slowed somewhat in the 1990s, and fell 
sharply during the financial crisis of 1997-1998. TFP recovered shortly after the crisis but 
then fell again after 2000. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
   Figure 2 illustrates recent trends in Korea’s imports and exports. International trade 
accounts for a substantial share of the Korean economy. The ratio of exports (EXP) to 
GDP fell below 30% during the late 1980s and mid-1990s but was about 40% or more 
during other periods. Imports (IMP) showed a great deal of cyclical fluctuation, but their 
share in GDP ranged between 30% and 40%. Overall, the share of imports declined in the 
early 1980s but bounced back since the early 1990s.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
   Before  performing  our  empirical  analysis, we carried out augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF), Phillips-Peron (PP), and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS, 1992) 
unit root tests to examine whether the time-series of the variables follow stochastic trends. 
Table 1 below reports the test results for both levels and first differences. The tests 
unambiguously suggest the existence of one unit root for every variable, indicating that 
the time-series are integrated of order 1, I(1). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cycles to productivity should be eliminated to prevent a spurious relationship. Therefore, it is quite natural 
that we have a high correlation after adjustment. 
  11   To address this problem, we check for the existence of long-run relationships among 
the variables. It is possible to derive a long-run equilibrium that does not suffer from 
spurious regression. Table 2 below presents the maximum-likelihood ratio statistics, 
which indicate the number of long-run relationships and thus the number of cointegration 
vectors in the parameter matrix. We perform Johansen’s cointegration test on the log 
values of three sets of variables, namely (1) exports (LEXP) and TFP (LTFP), (2) imports 
(LIMP) and TFP (LTFP), and (3) exports, imports, and TFP. The test results indicate that 
a restricted constant, which allows a non-zero drift in the unit root process, is included in 
the multivariate system of equations. The lag values of the VECMs are set equal to two. 
The null hypothesis of r=0 is rejected at the one-percent level but the null hypothesis of 
r≤1 cannot be rejected.
23 Consequently, the estimated likelihood ratio tests indicate the 
presence of a cointegration vector and a long-run relationship in the underlying data-
generating process of the time-series variables. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3.2 Causality between Trade and Productivity 
   Based on the test results of the previous section, we estimate a vector error correction 
model (VECM) and test for Granger causality on the basis of the coefficient estimates of 
the model. A VECM model consisting of the variables of IMP, EXP, and TFP may be 
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23 See Osterwald-Lenum (1992) for critical values. 
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   In a VECM, all variables included in   must satisfy I(1), and residuals from a long-run 
cointegrating relationship are used as lagged error correction terms in a VAR. If 
t y
c yt = ′ β  
represents a long-run cointegrating relationship and there is a deviation from long-run 
equilibrium, the error  c yt − ′ β is removed to restore equilibrium at adjustment speed α . 
   We look at VECM models consisting of two variables – IMP and TFP or EXP and TFP 
– and three variables – IMP, EXP, and TFP. The chosen ordering of variables is EXP, 
TFP and IMP, TFP for the bivariate models, and EXP, IMP, and TFP for the trivariate 
model; this ordering reflects the degree of exogeneity of the variables. However, changes 
in the order of these variables do not significantly affect our estimation results. Thus, 
= [LEXP (LIMP), LTFP] or  t y′ t y′= [LEXP, LIMP, LTFP], depending on the number of 
variables considered. To consider the effects of the Asian crisis and to eliminate any 
spurious correlation between trade and productivity growth, we include a dummy for the 
period 1998Q1-1998Q3 as the exogenous variable ( ) in (2) above. VECM systems 
with a lag length of two are estimated, and these lags are chosen to minimize the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC); however, changes in the lag length do not affect our results. 
t Z
   Table 3 below reports the VECM parameter estimates of the three variables, along with 
VAR model estimates. Although an autoregressive unit root characterizes every variable 
in the system, we also estimate VAR model to avoid any possible loss of valuable 
information owing to differencing.
24 In particular, we can expect VAR to elucidate the 
long-run relationship among the variables. Qualitatively, there are few differences 
                                                           
24 See Sims (1980) for a fuller discussion. 
  13between the VECM and VAR coefficient estimates. The most salient result of both 
models is that imports have a significant positive impact on TFP but exports do not. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
   Figure 3 below reports the impulse response functions in the VAR model, which are the 
simulated responses of TFP to the trade variables. They allow us to investigate the long-
run relationships between TFP and the trade variables. The impulse response function 
extends over ten quarters and is measured in terms of standard deviations. The effect of a 
one-standard-deviation shock to imports on TFP is initially positive and significant, and 
subsequently diminishes to zero. The effect of a shock to exports on TFP is positive but 
insignificant over the whole period. The responses of TFP to import and export shocks 
imply that TFP is correlated with imports but not with exports.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
      Table 4 below reports Granger-causality tests based on the coefficient estimates of 
three different models. The estimated models consist of two-variable VECMs, a three-
variable VECM and a three-variable VAR model. All the results indicate that there is no 
causality between exports and TFP growth. On the other hand, all the results indicate that 
imports Granger-cause TFP growth. In addition, the VAR model also indicates reverse 
causation from TFP growth to imports. Our finding of no correlation between exports and 
productivity growth in Korea is consistent with the earlier findings of Darrat (1986), 
Hsiao (1987), Dodaro (1993) and Dutt and Ghosh (1996). The most striking feature of 
our results is the correlation between imports and productivity. We can investigate the 
specific mechanism underlying the import-productivity nexus by decomposing imports 
into their various components, such as consumer goods versus capital goods, an issue we 
  14address in the next section. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
      Finally, productivity growth has opposing effects on imports and these may cancel 
each other out. Productivity growth raises imports by raising income but also reduces 
imports by increasing domestically produced import substitutes. Our finding that Granger 
causality from productivity to imports is significant only in the VAR model may reflects 
this ambiguity. 
   To check for the sensitivity of the results to the specification of economic growth, we 
substitute TFP growth with GDP growth in our VECM and VAR models, and perform 
the same tests. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the Granger-causality tests based on the 
coefficient estimates of these models.
25 The test results for GDP are qualitatively 
identical to the results for TFP. That is, no causality exists between exports and GDP and 
imports Granger-cause GDP growth in every model. Similarly, we also find reverse 
causation from GDP growth to imports in the VAR model. Our empirical results are thus 
robust in the sense that they are not sensitive to the specification of economic growth. 
Our evidence again fails to lend support to the export-led growth hypothesis for Korea 
during 1980-2003. 
3.3 The Effects of Different Import Components on Productivity 
   The empirical results of the previous section suggest that causality runs from imports to 
productivity growth. Based on these results, we disaggregate imports into various 
components and included them in a productivity determination equation for the purpose 
of investigating the import-TFP relationship in more detail. To determine the short-run 
dynamics of productivity determination, we regress TFP growth on import components, 
                                                           
25 The coefficient estimates are not reported here but available from the authors upon request. 
  15exports and other variables such as government size and R&D investments. Our TFP 
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   As  additional  explanatory  variables, we use government size (GOV) and R&D 
investments (R&D), which have been widely considered in the productivity literature, to 
represent institutional and technological factors, respectively. We use government 
consumption expenditure as a proxy for GOV to capture the inefficiencies arising from 
government failure. We use the number of patents registered in the U.S. as our measure 
of R&D. We include GOV and R&D in addition to the trade variables when we estimate 
the dynamic impact of trade variables on productivity. We disaggregate imports 
according to country-of-origin into imports from developed G7 countries (DIMP) and 
imports from other countries (OIMP). Developed countries in general and the G7 
countries in particular are the global technological leaders. As such, imports from the G7 
countries are more likely to embody advanced technology than imports from elsewhere. 
We also disaggregate imports according to processing stages into imports of raw 
materials (RIMP), capital goods (KIMP) and consumer products (CIMP). In particular, 
the critical distinction is that between imported consumer goods and imported capital 
goods. In contrast to consumer goods, capital goods such as machines are used to produce 
other goods. Therefore, while the main effect of consumer good imports is to intensify 
competition in the market for consumer goods, the main effect of capital good imports is 
to import the technology embodied in the good and thus bring about a more efficient 
production of other goods. The data on the five import components we just defined are 
available from KOTIS only after 1988Q1. 
  16   We eliminate seasonality from the variables by means of an X12-ARIMA, and we 
perform unit root tests on the variables. Since every variable is integrated of order 1, I(1), 
we use first differences in the actual estimation. We choose the lags of the explanatory 
variables by means of the “general-to-specific” method, in which the most insignificant 
lagged variable is eliminated iteratively from a set of lagged variables. In addition, we 
also applied the AIC criteria in selecting the appropriate number of lags. To incorporate 
the effects of the Asian crisis, we represent the period 1998Q1-Q3 with a dummy and 
include it in the estimation.  
   Table 5 below presents the coefficient estimates for equation (3), for each of the models. 
Prior to estimation, we examine correlation among the import variables. We find that the 
different import components are strongly correlated with each other. The correlation 
between (RIMP, KIMP), (RIMP, CIMP), (KIMP, CIMP) and (DIMP, OIMP) is 0.965, 
0.888, 0.916 and 0.966. The high correlation between the import components causes 
multicollinearity, and the significance of all import variables thus disappears when they 
are regressed together. Therefore, we do not simultaneously include the different import 
variables in our estimation. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
   Our empirical results indicate that exports do not have a significant effect on TFP 
growth. Furthermore, their coefficients are all negative except for Model 2. These results 
fail to support the export-led growth hypothesis with respect to TFP growth in Korea. 
However, these results do not imply that exports are not beneficial for developing 
economies since exports may improve economic performance through channels other 
than TFP growth. For example, exports allow for the realization of economies of scale 
  17and provide foreign exchange, thereby speeding up economic growth through capital 
deepening. We discuss this issue in more detail later. 
   The coefficients on government size (GOV) are all negative but insignificant, except in 
the case of Model 1, implying that increases in government spending may slow down 
TFP growth. TFP is a measure that captures productivity, which is based partly on 
institutional factors. Increased government spending may create inefficiency in the form 
of new regulations and bureaucracies. However, in light of GOV’s overall insignificance, 
we should be careful about drawing such conclusions. All of the coefficient estimates on 
R&D are positive and significant. Those findings suggest that R&D promotes innovation 
and technical progress, and thus promotes TFP growth. 
   All import component coefficients are positive, but their significance depends on both 
product type and country of origin. Imports of capital goods (KIMP) and consumer goods 
(CIMP) have positive and significant effects on TFP, but raw material imports (RIMP) do 
not have any insignificant effect. In addition, the coefficient estimates on imports from 
developed G7 countries (DIMP) are positive and significant, but those from other 
countries (OIMP) are insignificant. Among the various import components, consumer 
imports (CIMP) are the most significant and imports from developed countries have the 
largest coefficients. The significant coefficients of import components range from 0.042 
to 0.058, suggesting that imports have a strong impact on TFP growth. 
      Our empirical findings suggest that increased imports of consumer goods intensify 
market competition in Korea. Greater competition from imports forces import-
substituting Korean firms to become more competitive by improving quality, cutting 
costs or both. Examples of specific competitiveness-enhancing activities include adopting 
  18more efficient production techniques, engaging in innovation, and pursuing cost-cutting 
restructuring. Our findings also suggest that imports of capital goods help Korean firms 
to improve their productivity. If certain capital goods are domestically unavailable, their 
availability through imports may enable a firm to use them to improve the quality or 
reduce the costs of their products. Those imports can also enable a firm to produce a 
wider range of products. Capital goods often embody advanced technology and thus 
serve as powerful mechanisms for transferring technology to the importing firm. Our 
results also imply that technology transfer from developed countries has a significant 
positive effect on the efficiency of Korean firms. An important channel for importing 
superior technology is by importing goods which embody superior technology. 
Developed countries in general and the large G7 economies in particular are the global 
technological leaders. Therefore, imports from those countries are much more likely to 
embody advanced technology, in particular technology unavailable to Korean firms, than 
imports from other countries. In short, imports of consumer goods, capital goods and 
goods from developed countries have all contributed to Korean productivity growth. The 
contribution of consumer goods is largely through competitive effects while the 
contribution of capital goods and imports from developed countries is largely through 
technology transfer effects. 
      The intuition behind why competition should improve firms’ productivity is 
straightforward and plausible. Competition pushes down prices and hence costs, reduces 
slack and misallocation of resources, provides incentives for organizing production more 
efficiently, and may even potentially promote innovation. There are also more formal 
theoretical explanations for a positive relationship between competition and 
  19productivity.
26 For example, an increase in the number of firms will lead to sharper 
managerial incentives and thus improve managerial effort.
27 This is due to greater 
opportunities for comparing managerial performance. Alternatively, greater competition 
may make profits more sensitive to managerial effort.
28 A number of empirical studies 
provide support for the notion that competition promotes productivity.
29 Therefore, there 
are solid theoretical and empirical foundations for why we observe a significant positive 
impact of consumer good imports on Korean productivity.  
   Let us now look at the theoretical basis for our finding of significant positive TFP 
effects of imports of capital goods and imports from developed countries in Korea. 
Griliches (1992) introduces the distinction between embodied and disembodied 
technological spillovers. Embodied technological spillovers refer to knowledge and 
technology flows that arise directly from flows of goods and services between firms. 
Griliches argues that such spillovers can arise from either some kind of learning – pure 
spillovers – or the ability to reap the rents derived by the technological activities of other 
firms – rent spillovers. More specifically, rent spillovers are positive externalities which 
arise when the value of inputs exceeds the cost of inputs. The buying firm thus captures 
some of the rent associated with the technology of the imported good. Pure spillovers are 
positive externalities which arise from the dissemination of various competencies as well 
as knowledge in general. Technological spillovers are by no means limited to a specific 
country and can spread across borders. Indeed a number of empirical studies confirm the 
                                                           
26 See Okada (2005) for an overview of the theoretical literature. 
27 See, for example, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). 
28 See, for example, Willig (1987). 
29 See Okada (2005) and Nickel (1996, 1997), among others. 
  20importance of international technological spillovers as a source of TFP growth.
30 Our 
findings for Korea lend further support to such evidence.   
   With regard to the trade-growth nexus, the broad thrust of our results from the TFP 
growth equations is that exports do not cause growth but imports have a significant 
positive impact on growth. To check for the sensitivity of our empirical results to the 
specification of economic growth, we replace TFP growth with GDP growth. Although 
our results for the TFP growth regression indicate that exports do not contribute 
significantly to TFP growth, this does not necessarily mean that exports are not beneficial 
for a developing country, as we pointed out earlier. In particular, exports allow an 
economy to realize economies of scale and provide it with foreign exchange, both of 
which act as catalysts for capital accumulation and thus more rapid economic growth. 
That is, exports may contribute to growth through capital deepening in East Asia. This is 
in fact the viewpoint of the accumulationists, who assert that East Asian growth was 
mostly input-driven rather than productivity-driven. In short, exports may not cause TFP 
growth but nonetheless bring about economic growth through capital deepening. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to run GDP growth regressions to examine the role of exports 
in the Korean economy. 
   Table 6 below reports the coefficient estimates for the GDP growth regressions. The 
results of the GDP and TFP growth regressions are broadly similar. In particular, they 
both indicate that imports in general and consumer imports in particular benefit growth. 
Imports as a whole (IMP) and consumer-goods imports (CIMP) have a significant 
positive impact on GDP growth. In addition, all import components have positive effects 
                                                           
30 Such studies include Coe and Helpman (1995), Keller (2000), Grunfeld (2002), and Chuang and Hsu 
(2004). 
  21on GDP growth, but their significances falls in two cases. Specifically, imports from 
developed countries (DIMP) and capital-goods imports (KIMP) become insignificant. 
Thus, the technological transfer effects of imports are not as strong for GDP growth as 
they are for TFP growth. The overall impact of exports seems to be greater for GDP 
growth than for TFP growth since all export coefficient signs become positive except in 
Model 10. However, the export coefficients are still all insignificant except in Model 8. 
Our results thus still fail to support the export-led growth hypothesis. All the R&D 
coefficients are insignificant for GDP growth, although they were significant for TFP 
growth. Finally, all the government spending coefficients are insignificant and negative 
except in Model 9. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4 Concluding Remarks 
   The  existing  empirical  literature on the relationship between trade and productivity 
focuses largely on the relationship between exports and productivity. Our study will 
contribute to the substantially more limited literature on the relationship between imports 
and productivity. More specifically, our study is the first to systematically explore the 
relationship between trade and productivity growth in the Korean economy. In particular, 
our study differs from previous studies on the relationship between trade and productivity 
in Korea in that we examine the impact of both imports and exports on TFP. To do so, we 
use quarterly data from 1980Q1-2003Q3. In order to more clearly understand how 
imports influence TFP, we disaggregate imports into various components and look at the 
effect of those components on TFP. In addition, we remove cyclical effects from the 
productivity measures in order to control for spurious relation due the correlation 
  22between trade and business cycle. At a broader level, since Korea’s economic success is 
widely presumed to be supportive evidence for the export-led growth hypothesis, our 
empirical study will help us to more accurately and dispassionately assess the role of 
trade in the remarkable growth of Korean and other East Asian economies. 
   Causality tests indicate a unidirectional causality from imports to TFP growth and no 
correlation between exports and TFP growth. In light of the causality test results, our 
study estimates productivity equations to investigate the macroeconomic relationship 
between various components of imports and productivity. Our empirical results suggest 
that the imports of consumer goods and capital goods have a significant positive impact 
on TFP whereas raw material imports do not have a significant impact. The results also 
indicate that imports from G7 countries have a significant positive effect on TFP but 
imports from other countries do not. These findings imply that the beneficial impact of 
imports stems not only from competitive pressures arising from the imports of consumer 
goods but also from technological transfers embodied in the imports of capital goods and 
imports from developed countries. However, our GDP growth regression results suggest 
that the beneficial effect of imports on productivity arises primarily from the competitive 
effects of imported consumer goods. 
   Many earlier studies on the trade-growth nexus imply that exports enhance productivity 
growth because firms exposed to international competition tend to absorb best-practice 
technology. This argument served as a major rationale for why developing countries such 
as Korea erected trade barriers to protect their infant industries until they become 
internationally competitive. However, our empirical results suggest that lower trade 
barriers and higher imports would have been beneficial for Korea’s productivity growth 
  23during 1980-2003. Many recent studies have argued that Korean economic growth has 
relied to a large extent on factor input accumulation. Exports facilitate the mobilization of 
inputs by allowing for economies of scale and providing much-needed foreign exchange. 
Therefore, exports may contribute to economic growth through factor mobilization rather 
than productivity growth. To investigate this possibility, we replace TFP growth with 
GDP growth to test the sensitivity of our empirical results to the specification of growth. 
Our results remain the same – imports have a positive effect on GDP growth but exports 
do not. Our findings are thus robust with respect to the specification of growth and again 
fail to support the export-led growth hypothesis. 
   Our empirical findings have important implications for Korean policymakers. There is 
still a widespread philosophical tendency in Korea to view exports as beneficial and 
imports as harmful. This is perfectly understandable in light of the central role of export-
oriented industrialization in the transformation of Korea from a typical poor developing 
country into one of the most dynamic economies in the world. The Asian crisis of 1997-
1998 has further reinforced mercantilist tendencies by pointing to the potential benefits of 
running trade surpluses and thereby accumulating large international reserves. However, 
our findings clearly show that the notion of desirable exports and undesirable imports 
may be misguided and counterproductive. In the case of Korea, we find quite robust 
evidence in favor of the import-growth nexus, which is supported by the results of our 
causality tests, productivity determination regressions, and alternative specifications of 
growth. More specifically, we find that imports, but not exports, have a significant 
positive impact on TFP growth. It is worth remembering that Korea has already achieved 
a high per capita income level so that productivity growth will become more important 
  24relative to factor accumulation as a source of economic growth. The unmistakable 
implication for Korean policymakers is the need to open up more to foreign imports, 
which will help to bring about institutional and technological progress conducive to TFP 
growth. In light of our findings, policymakers in other East Asian economies, which 
share Korea’s experience of successful export-oriented industrialization, would also do 
well to consider the potential benefits of both imports and exports in formulating their 
trade and other policies.   
   Finally, we discuss the limitations of our study, which are primarily associated with 
data limitations. In particular, due to unavailability of the relevant data prior to 1980, our 
empirical analysis is limited to the post-1980 period. Korea’s rapid economic growth and 
industrialization began well before 1980 so that our empirical analysis does not cover the 
earlier stages of the Korean miracle. To the extent that there have been significant 
structural changes n the Korean economy since 1980, we have to qualify the validity of 
our empirical results to the post-1980 period. Nevertheless, the post-1980 period is very 
much an integral part of Korea’s remarkable economic success, so that investigating the 
role of imports in growth during this period will help us to gain a more comprehensive 
and well-balanced understanding of the relationship between trade and growth in Korea. 
Another potential limitation of our empirical analysis is that we are unable to examine the 
industry-specific effects of trade on productivity due to the poor quality of Korean 
industry data. In fact, it was such data limitations that prevented Lawrence and Weinstein 
(1999) from performing a more detailed empirical analysis of the imports-productivity 
nexus in Korean industries. This is unfortunate since it will be interesting to see how 
imports influence productivity in different Korean industries. An exciting area of future 
  25research is to empirically investigate the impact of imports on productivity in other 
countries. In this connection, it will be especially interesting to examine other East Asian 
countries, which share Korea’s experience of export-oriented industrialization.
31 This line 
of research will also help to clarify the role of trade in the East Asian Miracle.   
                                                           
31 In a recent contribution to this journal, Thangavelu and Rajaguru (2004) find that imports have a 
significant positive effect on labor productivity in a number of Asian economies. 
  26References 
Bahmani-Oskooee, M. and Shabsigh, G. (1991), “Exports, Growth and Causality in 
LDCs: A Re-Examinations," Journal of Development Economics 36: 405-15.  
 
Bahmani-Oskooee, M. and Alse, J. (1993), “Export Growth and Economic Growth: An 
Application of Cointegration and Error Correction Modeling," Journal of Developing 
Areas 27: 535-32. 
 
Baldwin, R. (2003), "Openness and Growth: What's the Empirical Relationship?" NBER 
Working Paper No. 9578.  
 
Ball, L. and Moffitt, R. (2001), "Productivity Growth and the Phillips Curve," NBER 
Working Paper No. 8421.  
 
Basu, S. and Kimball, M. (1997), "Cyclical Productivity with Unobserved Input 
Variation," NBER Working Paper No. 5915.  
 
Bernard, A. and Jensen, J. (1999a), "Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect or 
Both?" Journal of International Economics 47: 1-26.  
 
________. (1996b), "Exporting and Productivity," Yale University, mimeo, March.  
 
Balassa, B. (1978), "Exports and Economic Growth," Journal of Development Economics 
23: 181-189.  
 
Bonelli, R. (1992), "Growth and Productivity in Brazilian Industries: Impacts of Trade 
Orientation," Journal of Development Economics 39: 85-109. 
 
Chen, E. (1997), “The Total Factor Productivity Debate: Determinants of Economic 
Growth in East Asia,” Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 10: 18-38. 
 
Choi, Y. (2002), “Exports and Growth: An Empirical Investigation in Korea,” Quarterly 
Economic Analysis 8: 3-75.  
 
Chow, P. (1987), “Causality Between Export Growth and Industrial Development: 
Empirical Evidence from the NICs," Journal of Development Economics 26: 55-63.  
 
Chuang, Y. and Hsu, P. (2004), “FDI, Trade and Spillover Efficiency: Evidence from 
China’s Manufacturing Sector,” Applied Economics 36: 1103-1115. 
 
Clerides, S., Lach, S. and J. Tybout (1998), "Is Learning by Exporting Important? Micro-
Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 103: 903-947.  
 
  27Coe, D. and Helpman, E. (1995), “International R&D Spillovers,” European Economic 
Review 39: 859-887. 
 
Darrat, A. (1986), “Trade and Development: The Asian Experience," Cato Journal 6: 
695-699. 
 
Dodaro, S. (1993), “Exports and Growth: A Reconsideration of Causality," Journal of 
Development Economics 27: 227-244.  
 
Dutt, S. and Ghosh, D. (1996), “The Export Growth-Economic Growth Nexus: A 
Causality Analysis," Journal of Developing Areas 30: 167-81.  
 
Edwards, S. (1993), “Openness, Trade Liberalization and Growth in Developing 
Countries,” Journal of Economic Literature 31: 1358-1393. 
 
Gokcekus, O. (1997), “Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth: New Evidence 
from the Turkish Rubber Industry,” Applied Economics 29: 639-645. 
 
Greenaway, D. and D. Sapsford (1994), “What Does Liberalization Do for Exports and 
Growth?” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130: 152-174. 
 
Griliches, Z. (1992), “The Search for R&D Spillovers,” Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 94s: 29s-47s. 
 
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
Grunfeld, L. (2002), “International R&D Spillovers and the Effect of Absorptive 
Capacity: An Empirical Study,” NUPI Working Paper No.630. 
 
Haddad, M., De Melo, J. and Horton, B. (1996), “Trade Liberalization, Exports and 
Industrial Performance," in Roberts, M. and Tybout, J. (eds.) Industrial Evolution in 
Developing Countries: Micro Patterns of Turnover, Productivity and Market 
Structure, Washington DC: Oxford University Press.  
 
Hall, R. (1989), “Temporal Agglomeration,” NBER Working Paper No.3143.  
 
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. (1985), Market Structure and Foreign Trade, Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
 
Hsiao, M. (1987), "Tests of Causality and Exogeneity between Exports and Economic 
Growth: the Case of Asian NICs," Journal of Economic Development 12: 143-159.  
 
Hwang, I. (1998), “Long-Run Determinants of Korean Economic Growth: Evidence from 
Manufacturing,” Applied Economics 30: 391-405. 
 
  28Jin, J. (1995), “Export-Led Growth and the Four Little Dragons," Journal of 
International Trade and Economic Development 4: 203-215.  
 
Jin, J. and Yu, E. (1996), "Export-led Growth and the U.S. Economy: Another Look," 
Applied Economic Letters 3: 341-344.  
 
Jung, W. and P. Marshall (1985), “Exports, Growth and Causality in Developing 
Countries,” Journal of Development Economics 18: 1-12. 
 
Keller, W. (2000), “Do Trade Patterns and Technology Flows Affect Productivity 
Growth?” World Bank Economic Review 14: 17-47. 
 
Kim, S. and Lim, H. (2004), "Does Solow Residual for Korea Reflect Pure Technology 
Shocks?," presented at the Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society (FEMES) 
in Seoul, Korea, 1 July 2004.  
 
Kunst, R. and Marin, D. (1989), "On Exports and Productivity: A Causal Analysis 
Study," Review of Economics and Statistics 71: 699-703.  
 
Lawrence, R. (1999), "Does a Kick in the Pants Get You Going or Does It just Hurt? The 
Impact of International Competition on Technological Change in US Manufacturing" 
in Feenstra, R. (ed.) Globalization and Wages, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Lawrence, R. and Weinstein, D. (1999), "Trade and Growth: Import-led or Export-led? 
Evidence from Japan and Korea," NBER Working Paper No.7264.  
 
Mankiw, G. (1989), “Real Business Cycles: A New Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 3: 79-90. 
 
McKinnon, R. (1964), "Foreign Exchange Constraint in Economic Development and 
Efficient Aid Allocation," Economic Journal 74: 388-409.  
 
Muendler, Marc-Andreas (2004), "Trade, Technology and Productivity: A Study of 
Brazilian Manufacturers 1986-98," CESIFO Working Paper No.1148.  
 
Nalebuff, B. and Stiglitz, J. (1983), “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of 
Compensation and Competition,” Bell Journal of Economics 14: 21-43. 
 
Nickel, S., Nicolitsas, D. and Dryden, N. (1997), “What Makes Firms Perform Well?” 
European Economic Review 41: 783-796. 
 
Nickel, S. (1996), “Competition and Corporate Performance,” Journal of Political 
Economy 104: 724-746. 
 
Nishimizu, M. and Robinson, S. (1982), "Trade Polices and Productivity Change in 
Semi-Industrialized Countries," Journal of Development Economics 16: 177-206.  
  29 
Okada, Y. (2005), “Competition and Productivity in Japanese Manufacturing Industries,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 11540. 
 
Osterwald-Lenum, M. (1992), “A Note with Quantiles of the asymptotic distribution of 
the maximum likelihood Rank Test Statistics,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics 54: 461-471. 
 
Pavcnik, N. (2000), "Trade Liberalization, Exit and Productivity Improvement: Evidence 
from Chilean Plants," NBER Working Paper No. 7852.  
 
Pyo, H. (2003), “Estimates of Capital Stock by Industries and Types of Goods in Korea 
(1953-2000),” Panel for Korean Economic Analysis 9: 203-274.  
 
Shan, J. and Sun, F. (1998), “On the Export-Led Growth Hypothesis: the Econometric 
Evidence from China,” Applied Economics 30: 1055-1065. 
 
Sims, C. A. (1980), “Macroeconomics and Reality,” Econometrica 48: 1-48. 
 
Sjoeholm, F. (1999), "Exports, Imports and Productivity: Results from Indonesian 
Establishment Data," World Development 27: 705-715.  
 
Thangavelu, S. and Rajaguru, G. (2004), “Is There an Export or Import-Led Productivity 
Growth in Rapidly Developing Asian Countries? A Multivariate VAR Analysis,” 
Applied Economics 36: 1083-1093. 
 
Tybout, J. (2000), "Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries," Journal of Economic 
Literature 38: 11-44.  
 
Weinhold, D. and Rauch, J. (1997), “Openness, Specialization and Productivity Growth 
in Less Developed Countries," NBER Working Paper No. 6131.  
 
Willig, R. (1987), “Corporate Governance and Market Structure,” in Razin, A. and Sadka, 
E. (eds.) Economic Policy in Theory and Practice, London: Macmillan. 
 
World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle, Economic Growth and Public Policy, New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Xu, Z. (1996), “On the Causality Between Export Growth and GDP Growth: An 
Empirical Reinvestigation," Review of International Economics 4: 172-84.  
 
Yean, T. (1997), "Determinants of Productivity Growth in the Malaysian Manufacturing 




  30Figure 1 
 Growth of the Solow Residual and TFP with Cyclical Adjustment 
for the Korean Economy during 1980-2003 
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  32Table 1 
 Unit Root Tests of the Variables for the Relationship between Trade and 
Productivity Growth for Korea during 1980Q1-2003Q3 
 
ADF PP  KPSS   
I(0) I(1) I(0)  I(1)  I(0)  I(1) 













Notes: Test regressions contain a constant and a linear time trend, and lags of the dependent variable are 
chosen by AIC. 
*, 
** and 
*** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5, and 10% significance level, 
respectively. The null hypothesis is the existence of unit root for ADF and PP tests, and the non-existence 
of unit root for KPSS test. 
  33Table 2 
Johansen’s Log Likelihood Test for Cointegration of the Variables  for the 
Relationship Between Trade and Productivity Growth for Korea, 1980Q1-2003Q3 
 
H0 : rank=r  Eigenvalue  Max-Eigen stat 5 % Critical Trace stat.  5 % Critical
LTFP, LEXP 






None 0.298  32.63
** 15.89 34.85
** 20.26 
R≤1 0.023  2.223  9.164  2.223 9.164 
LTFP, LIMP, LEXP 
None 0.354  40.30
** 22.29 56.35
** 35.19 
R≤1 0.139  13.86  15.89  16.04 20.26 
Notes: Test regression includes a constant and a linear deterministic trend in the data. 
**, and 
*** denote 
rejection of the hypothesis at the 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. The test indicates 1 
cointegrating equation at the 5% significance level for every set of the variables. 
  34Table 3 
Coefficient Estimates of the VECM for the Relationship 
Between Trade and Productivity Growth for Korea, 1980Q1-2003Q3 
 
VECM VAR  Independent 
variables  LTFP  LIMP  LEXP  LTFP  LIMP  LEXP 
EC(-1)  -0.001 0.493 0.028       
 (0.038)  (3.985)  (0.254)      
LTFP(-1)  -0.330 -0.627  -0.664  0.602  0.090  -0.389
 (2.987)  (1.500)  (1.737)  (6.139)  (0.237)  (1.119)
LTFP(-2)  0.113 -0.482  -0.354  0.413  0.360  0.393 
 (1.085)  (1.215)  (0.976)  (4.201)  (0.941)  (1.127)
LIMP(-1)  0.064 0.068  0.102  0.066  0.825  0.073 
 (2.253)  (0.635)  (1.044)  (2.338)  (7.426)  (0.730)
LIMP(-2)  -0.016 0.005 0.209  -0.074  -0.052  -0.046
 (0.526)  (0.044)  (1.933)  (2.696)  (0.491)  (0.483)
LEXP(-1)  0.047 0.120  -0.063  0.043  0.086  0.955 
 (1.400)  (0.940)  (0.542)  (1.322)  (0.679)  (8.225)
LEXP(-2)  -0.022 0.205 0.014  -0.047  -0.111  0.018 
 (0.663)  (1.606)  (0.121)  (1.451)  (0.868)  (0.161)
C  0.016 0.036  0.038  0.060  0.524  0.004 
 (5.701)  (3.299)  (3.815)  (1.523)  (3.400)  (0.030)
Dummy  -0.015 -0.114 0.013  -0.013  -0.103  -0.004
 (2.223)  (4.433)  (0.564)  (2.326)  (4.491)  (0.210)
R
2 0.276 0.313  0.066  0.999  0.996  0.997 
Note: For VECM, all variables are first differenced for estimation. T-statistics are inside parentheses. 
  35Figure 3 
Impulse Response Functions in a VAR Model of 
Imports, Exports and TFP for Korea, 1980-2003 
 
  36Table 4 
Granger Causality Tests for the Relationship 
Between Trade and TFP Growth for Korea, 1980Q1-2003Q3 
 
Null Hypothesis ( )  0 H Test statistics ( )
2 χ Probability Results 
Bi-variate (VECM) 
∆LIMP  ∆LTFP  > ≠ 18.04
* 0.0001 Reject 
∆LTFP  ∆LIMP  > ≠ 1.176  0.555  Do not reject 
∆LEXP  ∆LTFP  > ≠ 4.088  0.129  Do not reject 
∆LTFP  ∆LEXP  > ≠ 1.366  0.505  Do not reject 
Tri-variate (VECM) 
∆LIMP  ∆LTFP  > ≠ 5.987
* 0.050 Reject 
∆LEXP  ∆LTFP  > ≠ 2.595  0.273  Do not reject 
∆LTFP  ∆LIMP  > ≠ 2.765  0.250  Do not reject 
∆LEXP  ∆LIMP  > ≠ 3.213  0.200  Do not reject 
∆LTFP  ∆LEXP  > ≠ 3.154  0.206  Do not reject 
∆LIMP  ∆LEXP  > ≠ 4.235  0.120  Do not reject 
Tri-variate (VAR) 
LIMP  LTFP  > ≠ 7.282
* 0.026 Reject 
LEXP  LTFP  > ≠ 2.228  0.328  Do not reject 
LTFP  LIMP  > ≠ 12.84
* 0.001 Reject 
LEXP  LIMP  > ≠ 1.199  0.548  Do not reject 
LTFP  LEXP  > ≠ 1.299  0.522  Do not reject 
LIMP  LEXP  > ≠ 0.595  0.742  Do not reject 
Note: Test statistics are Wald statistics, and test results refer to the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 
1% significance level.  
  37Table 5 
Coefficient Estimates of TFP Growth Equation for Korea, 1988Q1-2003Q3 
 
Independent 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6


















∆LIMP  0.079 
(3.420)
*      
∆LRIMP    0.012 
(0.562)      
∆LKIMP     0.042 
(1.855)
***    
∆LCIMP      0.042 
(2.045)
**   
∆LDIMP       0.058 
(1.983)
***  
∆LOIMP        0.045 
(1.644) 





























































2 R   0.381 0.254 0.283 0.287 0.286 0.275 
D.W.  2.467 2.456 2.506 2.403 2.489 2.487 
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and 
*** are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 
10% significance level, respectively.  
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Coefficient Estimates of GDP Growth Equation for Korea, 1988Q1~2003Q3 
 
Independent 
Variables  Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11  Model 12


















∆LIMP  0.202 
(7.216)
*      
∆LRIMP    0.021 
(0.884)      
∆LKIMP     0.041 
(1.723)     
∆LCIMP      0.129 
(3.212)
*   
∆LDIMP       0.043 
(1.342)   
∆LOIMP        0.041 
(1.378) 























































2 R   0.674 0.376 0.399 0.413 0.384 0.385 
D.W.  2.089 1.839 1.971 1.987 1.923 1.878 
 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and 
*** are statistically significant at the 1, 5 
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Granger Causality Tests for the Relationship between 
Trade and GDP Growth for Korea, 1980Q1-2003Q3 
 
Null Hypothesis ( )  0 H Test statistics ( )
2 χ Probability Results 
Bi-variate (VECM) 
∆LIMP  ∆LGDP  > ≠ 13.36
* 0.001 Reject 
∆LGDP  ∆LIMP  > ≠ 0.204  0.902  Do not reject 
∆LEXP  ∆LGDP  > ≠ 0.224  0.893  Do not reject 
∆LGDP  ∆LEXP  > ≠ 0.016  0.992  Do not reject 
Tri-variate (VECM) 
∆LIMP  ∆LGDP  > ≠ 11.68
* 0.002 Reject 
∆LEXP  ∆LGDP  > ≠ 0.397  0.819  Do not reject 
∆LGDP  ∆LIMP  > ≠ 1.179  0.554  Do not reject 
∆LEXP  ∆LIMP  > ≠ 1.626  0.443  Do not reject 
∆LGDP  ∆LEXP  > ≠ 0.866  0.648  Do not reject 
∆LIMP  ∆LEXP  > ≠ 3.330  0.189  Do not reject 
Tri-variate (VAR) 
LIMP  LGDP  > ≠ 16.98
* 0.000 Reject 
LEXP  LGDP  > ≠ 0.056  0.972  Do not reject 
LGDP  LIMP  > ≠ 7.611
* 0.022 Reject 
LEXP  LIMP  > ≠ 0.787  0.674  Do not reject 
LGDP  LEXP  > ≠ 0.123  0.940  Do not reject 
LIMP  LEXP  > ≠ 0.865  0.648  Do not reject 
Note: Test statistics are Wald statistics, and test results denote if the test rejects the null at the 5% 
significance level.   
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